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1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of power plays an important role in the social sciences
and Castelfranchi [4] emphasizes the importance of this concept
for multiagent systems. In [2] we build upon this work by distin-
guishing four viewpoints on multiagent systems: a mind structure,
a power structure, a dependence structure and a coalition structure.
These viewpoints are increasingly abstract conceptualizations of
systems as collections of autonomous cognitive agents. In [1] we
propose a way to deﬁne coalition structures from power structures.
In this paper we reﬁne this approach using task based power views,
and we relate it to central notions in game theory.
2. TASK BASED POWER STRUCTURE
A power structure is a more abstract conceptualization of a mul-
tiagent system than the usual one, because it does not mention ac-
tions or capabilities of agents. It directly characterizes the power
of agents as the goals they can achieve. In this paper we deﬁne
task-based power structures.
A task based power structure is composed of a set of agents Ag,
a set of all goals G, a set of all tasks T, a function goals that asso-
ciates with each agent the subset of goals G it desires to achieve,
and, ﬁnally, a function power that associates with a task assignment
¿ µ A £ T the sets of goals the task assignment achieves.
Inordertodeﬁnegametheoreticalnotionsofontaskbasedpower
structures, we also say that a task based power structure is super-
additive when, given two disjoint sets of agents that separately can
achieve respectively the sets of goals G1 and G2 by means of the
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task assignments ¿1 and ¿2, joined can achieve G1 [ G2 by means
of ¿1 [ ¿2.
DEFINITION 1. A task based power structure is a tuple
PS = hAg;G;T;goals: Ag ! 2
G;power: 2
Ag£T ! 2
Gi
where Ag is a set of agents, G a set of goals, T a set of tasks, goals
is a function that associates with each agent in Ag the subset of
goals G it desires to achieve, and power is a partial function that
associates with a task assignment ¿ µ Ag £ T a set of goals that
the task assignment achieves. Denoting with agents(¿) the set of
agents involved in ¿, i.e.
agents(¿) = fa2 Ag j 9t2 T : (a;t)2 ¿g
We say that a task based power structure is super-additive in the
case that, given ¿1 and ¿2 such that agents(¿1) \ agents(¿2) = ;,
if G12 power(¿1) and G22 power(¿2), then we have G1 [ G2 2
power(¿1 [ ¿2).
The more abstract power function we deﬁned in [2] power
0 :
2Ag ! 2
2G
can be derived from our task based power function
by power
0(A) =
fG j 9¿ µ Ag £ T : A = agents(¿) and G = power(¿)g
This more abstract power structure has been called a qualitative
coalitional game by Dunne and Wooldridge [7], such that we could
call our task based power structure also a task based qualitative
coalitional game. In their terminology, a coalition is a set of agents,
and the power function is called the characteristic function.
3. DO UT DES
There are many task assignments, but most of them will never
be considered by rational agents. This raises the question when
a task assignment is dominated by another task assignment, such
that we can restrict our attention to task assignments which are not
dominated. For example, when a task assignment contains an agent
which only proﬁts from the coalition, but which does not contribute
to it, then the other agents may prefer to form the same coalition
without this agent.
A general principle we introduce is the do-ut-des property, which
literally says “give something to obtain something else”. We con-
sidera cost-beneﬁtanalysis inwhich thecosts arethe tasksan agent
has to perform, and the beneﬁts are the goals of an agent that will
be achieved.
DEFINITION 2. Let PS = hAg;G;T;goals;poweri be a task
based power structure, and let ¿ µ Ag £ T be a task assignment.The beneﬁts and costs of the task assignment ¿ for agent a 2 Ag
are respectively deﬁned as follows.
beneﬁts(¿;a) = goals(a) \ power(¿)
costs(¿;a) = ft 2 T j (a;t)2 ¿g
A task assignment ¿1 is dominated by a contained task assign-
ment ¿2(½ ¿1) if either the beneﬁts are larger, or the cost are less
- all else being equal - for all the agents involved in ¿2 and for an
agent involved in ¿1 at least one of the relations is strict.
DEFINITION 3. Let PS = hAg;G;T;goals;poweri be a task
based power structure, let ¿1;¿2 µ Ag £ T be two task assign-
ments, and let ¿1 be at least as good as ¿2 for agent a 2 Ag if
beneﬁts(¿2;a) µ beneﬁts(¿1;a) and costs(¿1;a) µ costs(¿2;a).
A task assignment ¿1 is dominated iff there exists a task assignment
¿2½ ¿1 such that
1. ¿2 is at least as good as ¿1 for all agents a 2 agents(¿2),
and
2. ¿2 is strictly better than ¿1 for at least one of the agents a 2
agents(¿1).
We call task assignments which are non dominated do-ut-des task
assignments. They can be interpreted as a kind of possible agree-
ments or contracts among the agents (though the notion of contract
is much simpler than the notion of contract studied in some of our
other work [3]). The power structure in which only do-ut-des task
assignments occur in the function power, may be called a coalition
structure, see [2, 1].
4. BALANCING GOALS
Many task assignments are incomparable. For example, one task
assignment may have one goal as its beneﬁts, and another task as-
signment may have another goal as its beneﬁts. Likewise, a task
assignment may have one task as its costs, and another task as-
signment may have another task as its costs. This is analogous to
the comparison of multiple objectives in multiple criteria decision
making [5].
In this section we show under which hypothesis the do-ut-des
property can be related with the game theoretical notion of core as
deﬁned by Osborne and Rubinstein in [6] for super-additive coali-
tional games. Therefore in the following we consider only super-
additive task based power structures and we assume that a utility
function u(a;¿) associates with each agent a and task assignment ¿
a real value representing the proﬁtability of ¿ for a. We also assume
that u(a;¿) is a trade-off function f(beneﬁts(a;¿);costs(a;¿)),
this assumption is used in the proof of the Theorem 1, even if for
space reason we do not provide it here.
DEFINITION 4. A task based power structure with utilities PS
is a tuple hAg;G;T;goals: Ag ! 2
G;power: 2
Ag£T ! 2
G;u :
Ag £ 2
Ag£T ! I Ri, where hAg;G;T;goals: Ag ! 2
G;power:
2
Ag£T ! 2
Gi is a task based power structure and u : Ag £
2
Ag£T ! I R is a utility function on beneﬁts(a;¿) and costs(a;¿),
u(a;¿) = f(beneﬁts(a;¿);costs(a;¿)).
The core is a dominance criterion over the set of all possible task
assignments 2
Ag£T. In our context we adapt its deﬁnition as fol-
lows:
DEFINITION 5. LetPS = hAg;G;T;goals;power;uibeatask
based power structure, a task assignment ¿ is in the core iff there
does not exist an agent a such that u(a;¿) < u(a;;) and there
does not exist a ¿
0 6= ; such that for all a2 agents(¿
0), u(a;¿) <
u(a;¿
0).
Wedeﬁneaquantitativeversionofthequalitativedo-ut-desprop-
erty, calledgt-do-ut-desoptimality, andweuseittorelatethedo-ut-
des property with the notion of core. Informally, a task assignment
¿ is gt-do-ut-des optimal if there does not exist another task assign-
ment ¿
0 such that all the agents involved in ¿
0 earns by ¿
0 at least
the same as by ¿ and there exists at least an agent that earns by ¿
0
more than by ¿.
DEFINITION 6. We say that a task assignment ¿ is gt-do-ut-des
dominated iff there exists a ¿
0 such that
² for all a2 ¿
0, u(a;¿) · u(a;¿
0) and
² there exists an agent a such that u(a;¿) < u(a;¿
0)
A task assignment is gt-do-ut-des optimal if it is not gt-do-ut-des
dominated by any task assignment.
It can be shown that all do-ut-des optimal task assignments are
in the core.
Now we deﬁne which conditions the function u has to satisfy in
order to relate the do-ut-des property with do-ut-des optimality.
DEFINITION 7. A utility function u is do-ut-des compatible iff
¿2 is strictly better than ¿1 for an agent a implies that u(a;¿1) <
u(a;¿2).
The following theorem relates the do-ut-des task assignments
with the gt-do-ut-des optimal task assignments.
THEOREM 1. Given a do-ut-des compatible utility function u,
the following properties hold
² if ¿ is gt-do-ut-des optimal, then ¿ is do-ut-des.
² if ¿ is not gt-do-ut-des optimal, then there exists a do-ut-des
¿
0 that gt-do-ut-des dominates ¿.
Due to the previous theorem, in order to ﬁnd gt-do-ut-des opti-
mal task assignments, it is possible ﬁrst to reduce the search space
to the coalition structure of all the do-ut-des task assignments and
hence only in that coalition structure to verify gt-do-ut-des optimal-
ity. This is worthwhile, because to check if a task assignment ¿ is
do-ut-des you have to consider only the task assignments such that
¿
0 ½ ¿ and not all the possible task assignments ¿
0 as in Deﬁnition
6. Once found a gt-do-ut-des optimal task assignment we know
that it is also in the core.
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